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abstract
The TRIPS Agreement can be read to reflect a static view of the structure of
intellectual property law. In this paper, we address whether – and how – the
TRIPS Agreement can, on the other hand, be read with more fluidity, and
thus to allow adjustments in national intellectual property regimes designed to
reflect the dynamic nature of information production. To focus that inquiry,
we concentrate on efforts to ensure a broader public domain for ‘upstream’
inventions by modifying various elements of US patent law. The paper
considers three stylized examples and asks whether each approach could be
adopted by the United States without falling afoul of the TRIPS Agreement as
it is currently understood. Our purpose is to identify interpretive approaches
that allow member states to keep their laws attuned to the developments and
needs of science. But in so doing, we also raise broader questions regarding
the level of formalism generated by the WTO dispute settlement system, and
the extent to which the TRIPS Agreement allocates power between
supranational and national institutions, and between international and
national laws.

introduction
The size and content of a rich public domain are affected by a constellation of
national intellectual property rules. Since 1995, these domestic rules have, in
WTO-member states, been subject to the requirements of the Agreement on
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Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the TRIPS Agreement),1
which thus serves to regulate on an international level the ways in which
member states can shape the content of the public domain. At the time the
TRIPS Agreement was negotiated, the main focus of attention was on
codifying then agreed-upon norms of protection. As a result, the Agreement
can be read to reflect a static view of the structure of intellectual property law.
In this article, we address whether – and how – the TRIPS Agreement can be
read with more fluidity, in order to allow adjustments in national regimes
designed to reflect the dynamic nature of information production.
To focus that inquiry, we concentrate on efforts in United States patent law
to ensure a broader public domain for ‘upstream’ inventions, that is, for
discoveries so directly related to fundamental principles that they dominate
broad swathes of inventive opportunities. The expansion of patentable subject
matter to include upstream inventions has led concerned observers to suggest
that other elements of patent law must be modified in order to re-create
public-domain space in which work can be undertaken in accordance with
traditional scientific norms.2 Expanding the categories or the scope of
protectable subject matter in domestic law comports with a basic premise
of the TRIPS Agreement, which leaves considerable discretion to member
states to provide protection in excess of mandated minimum levels.3 But these
proposed modifications, by contracting protection, would arguably raise
TRIPS-compliance concerns, and bring into question the resilience of the
Agreement.
Evaluating a broad range of possible modifications in domestic law would
allow us to fully probe the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement to see which
are most hospitable to protecting the public domain of science. At this point,
however, we look at only three stylized examples. These are: (1) excluding
certain discoveries from the subject matter of eligible patent protection; (2)
creating a statutory exemption that gave courts discretion to permit
unauthorized uses of sufficient social significance; and (3) varying the right
to relief. This article asks whether each approach could be adopted by the
United States without falling afoul of the TRIPS Agreement as it is currently
construed. Our purpose is not to predict the outcome of future disputes –
there are far too few precedents for that. Rather, our goal is to identify
interpretive approaches that allow members to keep their laws attuned to the
developments and needs of science.

1

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the
Uruguay Round, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).

2

See below text accompanying nn 4–7.

3

See Pamela Samuelson, ‘Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic
Protection’, in International Public Goods, above n *.
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i. upstream patenting and its relationship to
technological progress
At one time, science was considered distinct from technology, and intellectual
property law was predicated on the existence of an analogous doctrinal
boundary between basic and applied research.4 Increasingly, however, United
States patent law recognizes private claims to core principles of knowledge
that are of special significance to basic research. This may simply reflect the
science-intensive nature of modern technology, which makes recent advances
inherently dual in character, or changes in the organization of science,
including the emergence of research organizations (such as universities) that
look to patent rights to support fundamental research. Whatever the cause,
patent protection has moved upstream.5
The net result is troublesome. Patents may now confer power not only in
product markets,6 but also in innovation markets. As such, these patents can
have broad significance. Because second comers can often invent around enduse inventions, patents rarely monopolized product markets. In contrast, a
patent on, say, the structural information of a protein, or on a metabolic
pathway, or a computer operating system, could give the patentee control
over all work involving that protein or pathway, or all opportunities to create
applications of that system. As a result, there is growing evidence suggesting
that – at least in the United States – patent rights over research opportunities
have begun to hinder progress by chilling innovation and impeding the
production of new knowledge.7

ii. hypothetical solutions and their international
implications
These developments give rise to many difficult questions for patent
policymakers. In this article, however, we ask a very specific question: what
can national legislators who perceive a problem do to fix it, consistent with
their countries’ international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement?
4

See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (holding that packets
containing mixtures of bacteria were ‘no more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature’
and hence unpatentable); Brenner v Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) (defining the utility required for
patent protection as end-use rather than research-use utility). See also O’Reilly v Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 62 (1853) (holding that abstract principles are not statutory subject matter).

5

See, e.g., Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 851 (1999).

6

In this context, product market means the market for products, processes, and the products of
processes.

7

See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This
Market Failing or Emerging?’, in Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diane L. Zimmerman, and Harry First (eds),
Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (2001);
Carlos M. Correa, ‘Internationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies’, 20 Wis. Int’l
L.J. (2002) 523, 528.
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A. Subject matter exclusions
The most direct way to deal with the problem of upstream patenting might be
to define patentable subject matter in a way that excludes inventions with
significant upstream applications from eligibility for protection. This approach
could be implemented across the board, or limited to areas where evidence
suggests that the chill to research is potentially great. For example, Richard
Epstein has suggested that the ‘use value’ of patents – their value in product
markets – should be compared to their ‘blocking’ value – their upstream
significance in innovation markets. When the blocking value exceeds the use
value, inventions within the subject area should not be considered
patentable.8 He gives the example of expressed sequence tags (ESTs), short
sequences of coding DNA, noting that while the useful applications of ESTs
barely meet the utility standard of current patent law, ‘[e]ach EST is a
gateway to some gene on which useful work could be done.’ Since the primary
use of a patent on an EST would thus be to block others from entering that
gateway, Epstein argues that such patents should not be issued.
John Barton takes a different approach. He would exclude specific subject
areas where this problem becomes acute. An example is proteomics –
information about the shape of the body’s protein molecules that is crucial to
understanding and predicting how the body will respond to pharmaceutical
interventions.9
We ask whether such carve-outs would meet the requirements of Article
27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which provides that, subject to defined
exceptions, ‘patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the . . . field of technology?’10 To analyze that question,
one can usefully distinguish between de iure and de facto forms of
discrimination. In the former situation, specific fields of technology are
carved out for special treatment; in the latter, rules that are facially neutral
have disparate effects on particular subject areas.
The language of Article 27 is clearly aimed at prohibiting de iure
discrimination with respect to the availability and enjoyment of patent rights.
The drafting history of the Agreement is replete with indications that a
primary concern of the negotiators was to eliminate blanket exclusions of
certain types of patentable subject matter (most notably drugs, agrochemicals
and foodstuffs).11 A subject matter exclusion directed at biotechnology
generally, or at specific areas within biotechnology, such as proteomics, would
thus almost certainly run afoul of the Agreement.
8

Richard A. Epstein, ‘Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material’, in F. Scott Kieff (ed),
Perspectives on Properties of the Human Genome Project (2003) at 153, 168–88.

9

John H. Barton, ‘United States Law of Genomic and Post-Genomic Patents’, 33 Int’l Review of
Indus. Prop. & Copr. L. (IIC) (2002) 779–910.

10

TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, art. 27.1.

11

See Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (Report of WTO
Dispute Settlement Panel, 2000) (‘Canada – Pharmaceutical Products’), at } 4.6 n 27.
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An approach that comes conceptually closer to Richard Epstein’s
suggestion is, however, more difficult to analyze. Facially, the provision is
neutrally drawn – it would bar patents on discoveries of predominantly
upstream significance in every field of technology. Nonetheless, it would more
profoundly affect biotechnology and computer science than, say, chemistry or
mechanical engineering. While this effort to define patentable subject matter
so as to exclude protection for inventions with significant upstream
applications does not directly implicate the motivating rationale for Article
27.1, its potentially disparate effect on different fields could conceivably fall
afoul of the literal text of Article 27.
Thus far, there have been no decisions directly addressing subject matter
exclusions under Article 27, but we inform our analysis with the observation
that WTO panels tend to hew closely to text when resolving disputes.12 The
panel in Canada – Pharmaceutical Products considered Article 27 in the course
of reviewing the TRIPS consistency of two exemptions that Canada had
enacted in its patent law. One of these, the so-called regulatory review
exemption, permitted use or manufacture of a patented invention solely for
purposes of obtaining regulatory approval. The intent was apparently aimed
at promoting competition between generic and proprietary pharmaceuticals
by facilitating market entry by generics at the moment of patent expiration.
While the exemption was expressed in technologically neutral language, the
European Union argued that its impact on the pharmaceutical industry
violated Article 27.1 under, essentially, a disparate impact theory.
The WTO panel rejected the EU’s specific contention, but only after
Canada assured it that the exemption was indeed neutral in the sense that it
was legally available to every product subject to marketing approval
requirements. In fact, the panel agreed with the EU’s larger point, that the
Agreement barred both de iure and de facto discrimination. In other words, it
appears that under this decision, the mere lack of a textual limitation to
particular fields will not immunize a provision from challenge.
Still, it may be possible to salvage Epstein’s approach. Patent laws tend to
apply differently across industrial sectors, depending on such factors as the
level of skill in particular fields,13 and it is difficult to believe that members of
the WTO would have readily committed themselves to altering this approach
to their domestic lawmaking. Indeed, the panel acknowledged as much,
stating, ‘Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide exemptions to deal with
problems that may exist only in certain product areas.’14
12

See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, ‘The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System’, 77
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (2002) 993, 1005–06 (‘Webster’s has become an essential research tool in WTO
TRIPS litigation’).

13

See Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’, 89 Va. L. Rev. (2003) 1575;
Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, ‘Is Patent-Law Technology-Specific?’, 17 Berk. Tech. L.J.
(2002) 1155.

14

Canada – Pharmaceutical Products, above n 11, at } 7.92.
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In fact, the panel’s report can be read as prohibiting de facto discrimination
only when the claim includes some additional element, such as an allegation
of an intent to discriminate. Thus, the panel stated, ‘it was not proved . . . that
the objective indications of purpose demonstrated a purpose to impose
disadvantages on pharmaceutical patents in particular, as is often required
to raise a claim of de facto discrimination.’15 While panels, both in the
TRIPS16 and broader WTO contexts,17 have acknowledged the difficulty of
identifying (and scrutinizing) the purposes behind particular national laws, we
find it entirely appropriate that those claiming de facto discrimination should
be required to demonstrate some element – like intent – over and above those
required to establish de iure cases of discrimination. At the very least, those
defending an exclusion should be permitted to rebut a showing of disparate
treatment by demonstrating a legitimate purpose. What these demonstrations
might entail, we leave to another day, but they might be satisfied by, for
example, demonstrating a close linkage between the exclusion and the
particular organizational or institutional structure (such as a bifurcated
generic and proprietary drug industry – or a decision to rely on patents to
support fundamental research) in the country in question.
The foregoing suggests that variations in result must be evaluated carefully
when determining whether national law violates the technological-neutrality
principle. Discrimination is not the same as differential treatment. This is not
to foreclose the possibility that a claim for de facto discrimination under
Article 27.1 could succeed, but this reading does suggest that nations retain
power to modify their notions of statutory subject matter along the lines of the
Epstein proposal in order to deal with changes in the relationship between
basic science and end-use technologies.
Arguably even more targeted carve-outs of the sort proposed by Barton
should be permissible. Although we recognize that such a conclusion runs
headlong into the literalism that panels have exhibited in interpreting TRIPS
and which would likely inform any reading of Article 27.1, if a legitimate
policy objective can be effectuated by a narrow, technology-specific exclusion,
we fail to see why Article 27.1’s commitment to formal neutrality should force
WTO Members to adopt exclusions that are broader than necessary. Such an
approach would appear to run counter to the underlying thrust of the TRIPS
Agreement toward enhanced protection. We address this paradox below in
connection with our discussion of Article 30.

15

Id, at } 7.105 (emphasis added).

16

See United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WTR/DS/160/R (Report of WTO
Dispute Settlement Panel, 2000).

17

See generally Robert E. Hudec, ‘GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an
‘‘Aim and Effects’ Test’’’, 32 Int. Law. (1998) 619, 626–33.
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B. Exemptions
To the extent that the problem with upstream patents is their capacity to
block pure research, another solution would be to permit certain activities to
be undertaken without a patentee’s authorization, in return for payment of a
nonmarket-based rent (or for free). For example, Maureen O’Rourke would
create a patent law exception, analogous to the fair use defense of copyright
law, one that could be tailored to the unique concerns of particular sectors of
the patent industry. Her analysis would consider (i) the nature of the advance
represented by the infringement; (ii) the purpose of the infringing use; (iii) the
nature and strength of the market failure that prevents a license from being
concluded; (iv) the impact of the use on the patentee’s incentives and overall
social welfare; and (v) the nature of the patented invention.18 A court would
use these factors to determine whether a patented invention could be used
without authorization, and also to assess royalties.
Professor O’Rourke’s proposal, if enacted into domestic law, could indeed
solve the upstream patent problem by freeing patented inventions for use in
fundamental research. However, Articles 27 and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement
each present problems for this approach.
1. Article 30’s ‘three-part test’
Article 30 provides that exceptions from liability for patent infringement are
permissible if they (1) are limited, (2) do not unreasonably conflict with a
normal exploitation of a patent, and (3) do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate
interests of third parties. O’Rourke’s proposal appears to accommodate these
criteria by requiring courts to consider similar parameters. This conclusion,
however, is not without doubt. There is a question about what WTO
adjudicators will make of the discretion that this exemption gives courts.
Certainly, the parameters that courts use in exercising that discretion would
become critical to a finding of TRIPS-compatibility.
Our analysis of factors that courts should consider is informed by two panel
reports, Canada – Pharmaceutical Products discussed above, and United States –
Section 110(5).19 In the former, two exemptions were challenged: the
regulatory review exemption described earlier, and a stockpiling exemption
that enabled the generic industry to manufacture patented products within
the last six months of a patent term (for sale upon expiry of the term). Two
exemptions were also at issue in the Section 110(5) case, both of which
permitted the playing of transmissions of recorded copyrighted music in
commercial establishments. In each case, it was claimed that the exemptions

18

See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Col. L. Rev. (2000)
1177, 1205.

19

See Canada – Pharmaceutical Products, above n 11; United States – Section 110(5), above n 16.
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at issue satisfied each of the cumulative three steps of the applicable test for
permissible exceptions (Article 30 for patents, Article 13 for copyright).20
2. Scope of uses: ‘limited’ exceptions
The Canada – Pharmaceutical Products panel stated that the term ‘limited’,
which is found only in Article 30,21 required that the exemption be a narrow
one, which the panel measured by reference to the extent to which the rights
of the patentee were curtailed.22 The stockpiling exemption was found not to
be limited because, during the last six months of the statutory term, it negated
all protection under three of the patentee’s five guaranteed rights (make, use,
or sell) with no limitations on the quantities produced or the market
destination of the products.23 In contrast, the regulatory review exemption
was considered ‘limited’ because it narrowly curtailed the patentee’s exclusive
rights. The extent of the acts permitted (i.e., those that were necessary to
comply with the regulatory approval process) was small and narrowly
bounded.24
On its face, O’Rourke’s proposed exemption resembles the invalid
stockpiling exemption in that it would appear to curtail all of a patentee’s
exclusive rights. One could certainly argue that if a provision was facially
unlimited, then it should be doomed. However, the Appellate Body has
cautioned that panels should not assume that a member state would act
inconsistently with its international obligations.25 If, in fact, courts were to
develop principles that limit the broad language of O’Rourke’s proposal to
bring it closer to the approved regulatory review exception, then it should
satisfy the first step of the three-step test in Article 30
3. Economic impact: conflict with normal exploitation
The Canada – Pharmaceutical Products panel concluded that the normal
practice of exploitation was ‘to exclude all forms of competition that could
20

See TRIPS Agreement, above n 1, arts. 13, 30.

21

The first step of the copyright test confines copyright exceptions to ‘certain special cases’, which the
panel interpreted to require, among other things, that the exception be limited and clearly defined.
United States – Section 110(5), above n 16 at } 6.107-6.110.

22

The panel concluded that the first step in the three-step test does not require consideration of the
economic impact of the exemption because that concern was taken up by the second and third step of
the test. Id, at } 7.49. Thus, even if the adoption of the proposed fair use or an experimental use
exemption did give rise to substantial economic impact (because, for example, protecting research
opportunities represents a large part of the patentee’s return at present) that would not of itself
prevent the exemption being regarded as limited.

23

In certain respects, the panel appeared to be incorporating some of the considerations relevant to
analysis under Article 31, which governs the grant of compulsory licenses, into Article 30 analysis.
The conditions in Article 31 are discussed briefly below in the context of discussing the
interpretation of Article 44.

24

Canada – Pharmaceutical Products, above n 11, at } 7.45.

25

United States – Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, } 259, WT/DS176/AB/R
(WTO Appellate Body, 2001) (citing Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, } 74, WT/DS87/AB/R,
WT/DS110/AB/R (WTO Appellate Body, 2000)).
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detract significantly from the economic returns anticipated from a patent’s
grant of market exclusivity’.26 Courts could ensure compliance with this
standard most directly by considering whether a challenged domestic
provision compromised significant economic opportunities.27 Yet, the
defense might survive challenge even if it were to render non-infringing
certain uses or acts for which patentees currently extracted payment. The
notion of normalcy should not be static but should evolve through successive
interpretations of Article 30 by panels, the Appellate Body, the TRIPS
Council, and future ministerial negotiations.28 As the two panels acknowledged, while this understanding should take account of national practices,
especially with regard to typical means of exploiting the patent and the source
of that commercial capacity, normalcy is ultimately a normative question – it
depends on a vision of the just balance between proprietary rights and public
access interests, and not purely on past practices. We suggest that the factors
mentioned by the panels should be considered, but that the normative
question should permeate the entire analysis.29
(a) National practices. In part, the Canada – Pharmaceutical Products panel
treated the ability to exploit the invention exclusively after patent expiration as
normal because it was typical, by which the panel may have meant that several
members had pre-market clearance procedures that had the effect of
prolonging the period of exclusivity beyond the time of patent expiration.30
Although state practice is clearly relevant to the creation of customary
international law, existing national laws should not of themselves be
permitted to entrench an international norm. Such an approach exalts
national laws inappropriately. Furthermore, because states are generally free
to exceed internationally mandated minima, there is a baseline issue: a denial
of exclusivity may be from a level of exploitation that exceeds the
internationally mandated standard. No rule of international intellectual
property law should prevent a state that enacts higher levels of protection
from reassessing the appropriate balance and offering protection that more
26

Canada – Pharmaceutical Products, above n 11, at } 7.55.

27

Such an approach might appear unduly internationalist in the current political climate. Thus, we
would rest on the canon of statutory construction that instructs judges to interpret domestic law,
where possible, in accordance with international obligations.

28

Cf. WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, } 5,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (14 November 2001) (‘while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS
Agreement, we recognize . . . flexibilities’). The traditional sources of customary international law
(including member state institutions) might also supply meaning to the concept.

29

These factors are not meant to be exclusive; in other cases, additional considerations may be
relevant.

30

Canada – Pharmaceutical Products, above n 11, at } 7.56. In fact, it is possible that the panel was
referring to the fact that such exploitation was typical of patents in all fields of invention or that it was
employed by ‘most patent owners’. Moreover, in United States – Section 110(5), the panel declined to
address the EU’s contention that ‘comparative references to other countries with a similar level of
socio-economic development could be relevant to corroborate or contradict data from the country
primarily concerned’, see } 6.189.
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closely hews to the minimum level.31 To suggest otherwise would create a
perverse result where states might be reluctant to expand intellectual property
rights lest that precluded them from readjusting levels of protection
downward through grants of specific exemptions.
Moreover, barring reform would be inconsistent with the notion that
members’ economic and social circumstances will change over time, and that
states should be free to adjust national laws to accommodate those changes.
From an institutional political perspective, it would validate the refrain of
many critics of recent international intellectual property developments that
the system operates as a one-way ratchet.
(b) Typical means of exploiting the patent. In determining normalcy for
purposes of Article 30, the Canada – Pharmaceutical Products panel may
alternatively have been considering what right holders regard as typical
exploitation practices. However, it was clearly unwilling to rely on that ground
alone. Likewise, the United States – Section 110(5) panel held that the extent to
which rights holders actually exercised their rights could not be ‘fully
indicative of normal exploitation’.32 Indeed, both panels offered a definition
of ‘normal’ that explicitly encompassed a normative assessment as well as an
empirical analysis of what was ‘regular, usual, typical or ordinary’.33
We are concerned, however, that despite this language, neither panel took
the normative dimension seriously; neither went so far as to articulate a
normative vision of exploitation. Instead, as Jane Ginsburg has commented,
the analysis in Section 110(5) sought only to ‘anticipate what the empirical
situation [would] be, [rather] than [provide] an explanation of what the right
holder’s markets should cover’.34 The intellectual property literature includes
a rich body of intellectual property theory, and the opening for normative
assessment provides a vehicle for panels to use this scholarship to develop
international law. Of course, a commitment to a broader approach would
inevitably draw panels into more intrusive assessments of national legislative
31

The Canada – Pharmaceutical Products panel noted that ‘the specific forms of patent exploitation are
not static, of course, for to be effective exploitation must adapt to changing forms of competition due
to technological development and the evolution of marketing practices,’ id, } 7.55. This language
appears largely directed at efforts to expand forms of exploitation but the general proposition holds
true.

32

United States – Section 110(5), above n 16, at } 6.196. The patent standard in article 30 (but not the
copyright equivalent in art. 13) allows conflicts with normal exploitation provided they are
reasonable. It would thus appear to afford member states greater latitude on the second leg of the
patent exemptions test. But in both provisions, the permissible conflict is measured against the same
norm, that is ‘normal exploitation’.

33

See United States – Section 110(5), above n 16, at } 6.166 (‘dynamic, approach, i.e., conforming to a
type or standard’); Canada – Pharmaceutical Products, above n 11, at } 7.54 (‘The term [‘‘normal’’]
can be understood to refer to an empirical conclusion about what is common within a relevant
community, or to a normative standard of entitlement.’ The panel concluded that the word ‘normal’
was being used in Article 30 in a sense that combined the two meanings.).

34

Jane C. Ginsburg, ‘Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the ‘Three
Step Test’ for Copyright Exemptions’, 187 Revue Internationale Du Droit D’Auteur (2001) 3, 17.
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values. But, as the Appellate Body recognized in its first TRIPS report,35 and
as the United States – Section 110(5) panel hints in its discussion of ‘normal’, it
is the responsibility of panels to make critical assessments of national law.36
(c) Source of commercial capacity. The Canada – Pharmaceutical Products
panel declined to treat as normal the ‘additional period of de facto market
exclusivity created by using patent rights to preclude submissions for
regulatory authorization’ because it was ‘not a natural or normal consequence
of enforcing patent rights’.37 It was the product of a combination of patent
laws and the regulatory approval scheme – a commercial rather than a legal
effect.
We agree that a rigorous inquiry into the nature and source of control
should inform the analysis. Enhanced commercial exploitation may arise from
the availability of technological protection measures that reinforce statutory
rights; from contracts that parties enter on account of industry structure or
because the costs of challenging an exclusive right outweighs the benefits of
cooperation; or more darkly, from market power and undue commercial
leverage. Absent such inquiry, invalid assertions of rights and the flexing of
market muscle may be elevated to international law.
Applying this multi-factored approach to O’Rourke’s proposal produces a
mixed picture. Many states afford exemptions for socially significant uses, but
these exemptions do not give courts the kind of case-by-case discretion
envisioned by O’Rourke.38 But to the extent that US courts developed
permissible uses that parallel such exemptions, national practices should
support a finding of compliance.39 On typicality, unauthorized uses that stem

35

India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/D550/AB/R
(Report of the Appellate Body, 1997).

36

Determining the contexts in which international norms should trump national determinations will
obviously depend on both the substantive intellectual property values and systemic values underlying
the international system. The Appellate Body seems to have left room for deference to national
welfare considerations if not in direct conflict with the literal text. See TRIPS Agreement, above n 1,
Preamble; J. H. Reichman, ‘Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement after U.S. v India, 1
JIEL (1998) 585, 597.

37

Canada – Pharmaceutical Products, above n 11, at } 7.57.

38

Research exemptions are fairly common to domestic law, and pending EU proposals for a
Community Patent would exempt ‘acts done privately for non-commercial purposes’, and ‘acts done
for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention’. G. B. Dinwoodie
and R. C. Dreyfuss, ‘WTO Dispute Resolution and the Preservation of the Public Domain of
Science under International Law’, in K. E. Maskus and J. H. Reichman (eds), International Public
Goods above n * (citing sources).

39

Moreover, once we are free to infuse the term ‘normal’ with normative and not merely empirical
meaning, one further argument that might be used to defend an exemption under Article 30 would
be to cast the exemption as an effort to restore patent protection to levels that reinstate the ‘normal’
exploitation that existed before the recent developments that have motivated concern. In so doing,
empirical evidence of practice might plausibly be relevant, but it is hard to see how practices in 2003
have any greater claim to determine normalcy than practices in 1993.
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from market failure present the strongest case because the patentee could not
exploit that market. Further, the normative analysis is key here. From a
theoretical perspective, states need the ability to calibrate the degree of
freedom given to second-comers according to the needs and maturity of
particular industries. The proposal is weakest when analyzed in terms of the
source of the capacity to exploit because in most cases it will stem from patent
rights. Two points should be kept in mind. First, the conclusion on normalcy
depends on an interaction of relevant factors, not a cumulative satisfaction of
each. Second, the entire analysis must be infused with normative content. To
the extent that O’Rourke is preserving a competitive research (as opposed to
end-use) market, her proposal furthers the goals of intellectual property law.
4. Types of uses: unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests
Both components of the third step of Article 30 clearly involve a normative
assessment, as the Canada – Pharmaceutical Products panel acknowledged.40
Thus, much of what we said above is relevant here. However, there is no
international norm to deal with the problem of preserving a robust research
market in the face of upstream patenting. When the Canada – Pharmaceutical
Products panel found that there was no controlling international norm in that
case, it suggested deference to local autonomy,41 and that approach may well
support the O’Rourke proposal.
The validity of the exemption is bolstered by the last clause of the third step
in Article 30, which (unlike its copyright counterpart in Article 13) explicitly
calls for a panel to ‘take account of the legitimate interests of third parties’.
The panel hinted that considerations such as society’s interest in promoting
progress, and scientists’ interest in free inquiry, might be considered
‘legitimate’ within the meaning of Article 30.42 Further, although the panel
cautioned that Articles 7 and 8, which speak of promoting technological
innovation to the mutual advantage of producers and users, and of protecting
public health and promoting the public interest, cannot be used to reargue the
balance struck in Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, they can shed light on
the meaning of ‘legitimate interests’. Thus, if the availability of the exemption
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If normal exploitation is judged from the ways in which patentees have traditionally captured
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depends, as O’Rourke contemplates, on market failures that preclude
contracts that would advance overall social welfare, a panel might accept
the argument that the exemption was TRIPS-consistent.
5. Article 27’s technological neutrality
Another possible challenge to O’Rourke’s approach is rooted in the
technological neutrality principle of Article 27, which the Canada –
Pharmaceutical Products panel read as imposing an additional hurdle for
member states seeking to invoke Article 30 to justify domestic exemptions to
the exclusive rights required by international patent law. The panel appeared
to regard Article 27.1 as a structural provision, part of the fabric of the
Agreement as a whole, which can be transposed to the analysis of other
provisions.
If Article 27 does apply to exemptions within Article 30, the O’Rourke
proposal appears vulnerable to challenge. Although this ‘fair use’ exemption
would not be aimed at specific subject matters of invention, it is likely that the
factors would play out differently in different fields. Indeed, the fifth factor in
the O’Rourke analysis – the nature of the patented invention – makes this
possibility explicit. We believe, however, that the O’Rourke approach remains
appropriate because the policy concerns that underlie her analysis tend to
become more acute in some fields than others. Thus, we think the panel was
wrong in applying Article 27.1 to exemptions. As noted earlier, there are good
reasons why different technologies or different uses may require different
judicial or legislative treatment. It seems counterproductive to require socially
desirable exemptive solutions to extend to all technologies when technologyspecific problems require technology-specific solutions.43
Indeed, requiring exemptions to be technologically neutral appears
particularly anomalous in that it tends to make a broader than necessary
exemption more sustainable under international law than a narrow exemption. This outcome conflicts with the norm contained in Article 30 that
expressly requires the availability of exemptions to be evaluated in terms of
whether any given exemption is ‘limited’. A targeted exemption that
differentiated between different types of invention would limit a patentee’s
rights only in areas where there was a perceived imbalance between public
and private rights. Regardless of whether a panel might be more sympathetic
to an exemption that is cast in general terms, the policies underlying the
TRIPS Agreement favor exemptions that are either targeted or, though
framed broadly, evolve to permit particular limited uses. A formalist
commitment to technology neutrality is inconsistent with a purposive reading
of the TRIPS Agreement.
43

If the approach of the Canada – Pharmaceutical Products panel prevails, we could present this
argument under the rubric that, as explained above, a mere difference in treatment of different
technologies might not amount to discrimination in violation of art. 27. See above text accompanying
nn 13–17.
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C. Remedies
A third way to protect the public domain of science is to vary the terms of
relief so as to immunize upstream researchers from liability for patent
infringement. One idea, proposed by one of us and modified by Richard
Nelson, would benefit non-commercial research organizations, especially
universities and their employees, if 1) the patented materials they wished to
utilize were not made available on reasonable terms; 2) the investigators
agreed to publish their research results; and 3) the investigators agreed either
to refrain from patenting the research results or to patent and then license the
result on a nonexclusive basis and on reasonable terms.44
The compatibility of this solution with TRIPS obligations is difficult to
gauge in light of the disputes resolved so far.45 Immunizing certain users from
liability could be categorized as an exemption to the right conferred and
analyzed under Article 30.46 If so, then the argument would be similar to the
one set out above, with the added observations that this approach curbs the
judicial discretion that engendered some ambivalence in our analysis of the
open-ended exemption. It also seems unlikely to intrude seriously on the
patentee’s own interests. While it could reduce markets for research tools,
only those markets that the patentee refused to supply would be affected.
Some opportunities may also be lost in the innovation market, but because
these opportunities would likely be non-commercial, fundamental research
opportunities, they are likely to be rather low on a commerce-minded
patentee’s own priority list.
We are not, however, convinced that Article 30, standing alone, should,
provide the appropriate framework of analysis. While Article 30 imposes wellestablished strictures of international law on what member states can do, the
TRIPS Agreement as a whole appears to envision far more latitude at the
remedial phase. The flexibility that the TRIPS Agreement preserves is most
evident in Article 41, which sets out WTO Member’s enforcement
obligations.47 Subsection 5 explicitly provides that Members are not required
to enforce intellectual property law in a manner different from how they
enforce their laws in general. This deference constitutes a structural value.

44

See Rochelle Dreyfuss, ‘Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material: A Counter-Proposal to
Richard Epstein’s Steady Course’, in Perspectives on Properties of the Human Genome Project, above n 8,
at 204–5; Richard Nelson, ‘The Market Economy and the Scientific Commons’, Research Policy
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Members need discretion to choose the means by which they satisfy effective
enforcement obligations because enforcement implicates questions of
resources and institutional priorities that go to the heart of national political
ordering in ways that far transcend intellectual property law.
Other more specific remedies provisions also create substantial flexibility.
Article 45 requires member states to give judicial authorities power ‘to order
the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate’.48
However, when a court exercises that authority, adequacy is measured
entirely by local conditions. In markets where demand for the product – or
ability to pay – is low and in markets that have price controls in place, the
compensatory award will be low.49 The award will, in other words, reflect
local conditions, desires, and needs. This is as it should be: a patent is a right
to exclude, not a right to exploit. Even the provisions that protect the right to
exclude can be read as creating substantial space for sovereign interests.
Although Article 44.1 requires member states to give judicial authorities power
to order injunctive relief, nothing in the provision expressly requires courts to
enter such orders. United States law reads the same way in that it is
interpreted to give courts considerable discretion to tailor injunctions to
specific (local) conditions.50
Given this degree of flexibility, an approach based on remedial immunity
should be considered consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. Monetary
rewards could be reduced to zero for the same reasons that monetary relief is
traditionally low in some situations: the relevant user groups – in this case,
non-commercial research institutions – lack resources to pay for the inputs
they need. Moreover, the economic value of the use – in this case, basic
research – is highly speculative, and courts do not generally award speculative
damages.51 Injunctive relief is also denied for familiar reasons, sounding in
the need to deal with important social problems. In this case, that might
include an organizational structure for science in which fundamental and
applied scientific research are conducted in different institutions, coupled
with a cultural aversion to entering into binding transactions with strangers in
the face of scientific and business uncertainty. Admittedly, relief under this
proposal is withheld across the board, rather than on the typical case-by-case
basis. Yet, efficiency or other values often require the articulation of a rule
that constrains equitable discretion and reduces reliance on case-by-case
48

Id, art. 45.
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analysis.52 An approach to the enforcement provisions of TRIPS that prevents
a member from choosing between a case-by-case or a rule-based approach
might be thought to impose on such a state the obligation to enforce
intellectual property law in a manner different from the enforcement of laws
generally. Indeed, where TRIPS negotiators thought that members had to be
constrained in permitting a broad rule-based approach to adjudication, they
included a provision to that effect.53 Finally, the requirement of ‘effective
remedies’ in Article 41.1 is preserved in that the patent remains valuable for
many purposes. For example, it can be used to extract remuneration in other
markets, and it retains its value as a signal to potential collaborators and
investors.
As a matter of policy, it makes sense that the net result should be that
member states retain authority to control the terms on which basic research is
conducted. Given that members appear free to hold down the profits that
innovators can earn by such actions as permitting parallel imports, or
imposing compulsory licenses or price controls,54 it is important that they
remain equally free to control the costs that innovators face. Otherwise, price
could, in theory, fall to the worldwide demand price (or to the price set by the
government with the most stringent price controls), while the costs of research
and development would be entrenched by the Agreement.55

concluding observations
Our case studies demonstrate that a country that perceives a problem with the
patenting of upstream research has a variety of ameliorative approaches at its
disposal, each with different pay-offs as a matter of domestic policy. These
approaches are also likely to provoke different responses at the international
level. Unless Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement is read narrowly, subject
matter exclusions may be impermissible; an open-ended exemption could be
heavily dependent upon a domestic interpretation that tracks international
standards; and the immunity approach may violate remedies obligations, even
for patented technologies that are principally utilized in basic research.
Should the TRIPS Agreement be read to constrain national choices in this
formalistic way? Consider, for example, the provision of current United States
law on which the immunity defense outlined above was based. It immunizes a
52
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‘medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity’ that would
otherwise constitute infringement. If the analyses of Articles 30 and 44 that
we put forward are rejected, then this provision could also be found to violate
the TRIPS Agreement. Yet, a subject matter approach to surgical method
patents would clearly be upheld under Article 27.3(a), which permits
members to exclude surgical methods from patentability.56 It is difficult to
see why WTO panels should adhere strictly to this formalistic approach,
which requires these choices to be analyzed separately.
Of course, formalism may have a role to play. Our analysis also raises the
question whether any provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are what we have
called structural or horizontal in nature, part of the fabric of the Agreement as
a whole, which should be transposed to the analysis of other provisions. The
Canada – Pharmaceutical Products panel appeared to regard Article 27.1 as one
such provision and superimposed its technological neutrality principle on
Article 30. Although the Agreement no doubt contains some provisions (such
as national treatment) that possess this structural character, panels should be
cautious before elevating any particular provisions to this status, especially
when these are ostensibly directed at specific issues rather than delineated in
that part of the Agreement that addresses General Provisions and Basic
Principles.57
In its latest TRIPS report, United States – Section 211, the Appellate Body
attached great weight to the characterization of the law being challenged.58
Such formalism may be necessary in the early stages of a lawmaking
enterprise. However, characterization must be performed with attention to
substantive goals. In multistate private litigation where choice of law is an
issue, courts have long used a similar process. In those cases, the forum does
not regard itself as bound by the characterization of the state that enacted the
rule, but instead it makes its own assessment based on the state interests that
underlie the law.59 In our present context, panels should do likewise,
especially in the early years when they are considering state laws that were not
formulated with TRIPS categories in mind. The appearance of arbitrariness
will best be avoided by a process of characterization that is alert to the
substantive purposes of intellectual property law.
It is also important for panels to keep what might be called the ‘neofederalist’ underpinnings of the TRIPS Agreement in mind. The Agreement,
as an instrument of intellectual property law, must strike a balance between
sufficient levels of protection to stimulate the desired social and commercial
56
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activity undertaken by first-comers, and sufficient limits on those rights to
ensure the maximum socially useful exploitation of that activity. It partly
achieves this balance substantively by allocating rights as between private and
public interests, that is, between producers and users of intellectual property.
But TRIPS, like any international agreement, must also deal with issues such
as sovereignty, diversity, and legitimacy that pervade international relations. It
must accordingly allocate power between supranational and national
institutions, between national and international laws. In the TRIPS context,
that allocation has the additional effect of giving member states an important
role in striking the producer/user balance of intellectual property law.60
In the discussion above, much of our argument rested on recognizing the
importance of this neo-federalist structure. Thus, a decision to allow WTO
Members to create a larger public domain by one method or another may be a
product not of an intellectual property balance that the TRIPS Agreement
mandated, but rather a consequence of the conferral of autonomy on national
governments. For our case study, it seems to follow that the United States can
enact a particular regime not because it embodies a balance between public
and private interests that was struck in the TRIPS Agreement, but rather
because that Agreement allows its members to make a range of determinations, of which the one adopted by the United States is a permissible option.
To put it another way, because the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated with
the goal of promoting international trade, the goals of substantive balance
common to domestic intellectual property systems are barely discernible in its
provisions. Nevertheless, panels must take seriously the autonomy interests
implicit in the structure of the international intellectual property system, and
they must allow sovereigns to respond to changes in science, to the structure
of their patent industries, or to other social needs. Otherwise, a series of
worldwide disutilities will result.
In passing, we have suggested various systemic values that are crucial to this
approach to analyzing TRIPS obligations: the incentives likely to optimize
social utility may vary widely from country to country; permitting some
diversity of approach allows nation states to act as laboratories in the
development of international rules; affording space for the self-determination
of sovereign states encourages voluntary and ultimately more effective
compliance with international norms; and, universality may have costs,
whether measured in economic or non-economic terms. We plan to develop
these systemic values at greater length in another article. Fully articulating the
latitude afforded WTO Members under international intellectual property
law will provide scholars and national policymakers with a sense of the
boundaries within which these domestic debates can then occur.
60

Characterization will also be a tool for implementing the principles of neo-federalism that we discuss
above. Cf. Dicey & Morris, above n 59, at 2–039 (noting that in private multinational litigation,
characterization by a forum is simply the refinement or redefinition of the forum’s conflicts rule).

